S.Ct Upholds Private School Reimbursement under IDEA

The Supreme Court ruled today 6-3 that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) authorizes reimbursement for private school tuition when a public school fails to offer the student an individualized educational program...

The Supreme Court ruled today 6-3 that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) authorizes reimbursement for private school tuition when a public school fails to offer the student an individualized educational program (IEP), regardless of whether the child previously received special education services from the public school. At the Federal Rights Project, we have been watching this case with keen interest for its discussion of the issue of the notice requirement for Spending Clause statutes. Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court holds that the States had notice of their obligations to reimburse tuition under such circumstances. Justice Souter wrote a dissent joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Forest Grove School District v. T.A., No. 08-305. 557 U.S. __ (2009).

T.A., a high school student, had difficulties with his school work. The public school psychologist performed an evaluation and based on that, the school concluded that T.A. was not eligible for special education services. As a result, he was not offered an IEP by the public school. The parents utilized private testing, and T.A. was diagnosed with ADHD. The parents placed him in a private school for students with special needs and sought reimbursement from the public school. The public school continued to find that he was not eligible for an IEP, and thus ineligible for special education services. The parents requested a hearing and the hearing officer held that the public school erred in not identifying T.A. as eligible for special-education services. The hearing officer ordered the school to reimburse the private tuition. The school appealed to the district court. The court held that the reimbursement of tuition for a student not previously receiving special education services from the public school was barred by the 1997 amendments to the IDEA. But the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the amendments did not categorically bar such reimbursement. The Supreme Court granted cert to resolve a conflict among the circuits.

Justice Stevens started out by finding that "a school district's failure to propose an IEP of any kind is at least as serious a violation of its responsibilities under IDEA as a failure to provide an adequate IEP." The Court then turned to the school's argument that reimbursement was barred by the 1997 amendments. The school relied upon a provision which states that a "court or hearing officer may require [a public] agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of [private-school] enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available" and the child has "previously received special education and related services under the authority of [the] agency." The school argued that because this provision only addressed children who had received special education services from the public school, the IDEA permits reimbursement only in those circumstances. The Court disagreed, finding the school's interpretation contrary to the "text and context" of the 1997 amendments. The Court held that the phrase "may require" was not an exclusive list, precluding any other circumstances. The Court stated that the amendments "are thus best read as elucidative rather than exhaustive."

The Court further emphasized that the school's reading of the statute "is also at odds with the general remedial purpose underlying IDEA and the 1997 amendments," specifically to provide a free appropriate education to children with disabilities. Stevens highlighted the importance of matching remedies to rights and said the school's position was "irrational." He explained: "It would be particularly strange for the Act to provide a remedy, as all agree it does, when a school district offers a child inadequate special-education services but to leave parents without relief in the more egregious situation in which the school district unreasonably denies a child access to such services altogether."

The school further argued that it did not have adequate notice of its liability for such tuition reimbursement, and that because the IDEA is a Spending Clause statute, any conditions imposed on a State must be unambiguous. Stevens concluded broadly that the IDEA puts States on notice that the "IDEA authorizes courts to order reimbursement of the costs of private special education services in appropriate circumstances. " Stevens found that this sufficed to comport with the notice requirement for Spending Clause statutes.

Stevens was similarly unsympathetic to the school's argument that permitting such tuition reimbursement would encourage parents to place their children in private school without first cooperating with the school district. Stevens summarily rejected that argument on the grounds that courts weigh the equities and would therefore not reward such non-cooperation. He also cited the amicus brief of the National Disability Rights Network for the principle that "the incidence of private-school placement at public expense is quite small."

Justice Souter's dissent argued that the 1997 amendments were clear in precluding tuition reimbursement when the child had not previously obtained services from the public school. He also emphasized the high price tag of reimbursement of private school tuition.