W.D.Mich.: No damages under RLUIPA; limited reading of PLRA

A Michigan federal district court held that states’ waiver of immunity under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalize Persons Act (RLUIPA) does not extend to liability for damages.

The opinion suggests that courts should construe remedies under an express statutory right of action more narrowly than under an implied right of action. The court also held that RLUIPA does not permit individual liability, and that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) does not limit punitive damages or damages for First Amendment claims. Porter v. Caruso, 2008 WL 3978972 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2008) (No. 1:05-cv-562).

 

          There is a circuit split on damages under RLUIPA: Compare Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118 (4th Cir.2006) (no damages - summary here), with Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir.2007) (permitting damages - summary here)). Madison reasoned that a waiver of immunity “for some type of remedy does not necessarily extend to suits for damages,” and that a waiver must be unambiguous with respect to damages. Relying on Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), the Allen court followed the general rule that courts should “presume the availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.” Various district courts have lined up with one view or the other.

 

          Here, Porter brought RLUIPA and First Amendment claims regarding denial of access to an ankh, a symbol of his religion. The court was persuaded by Madison, finding two grounds for rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s its reliance on Franklin: (1) “the Franklin Court was engaged in the admittedly speculative task of attempting to define the remedies available in an implied right of action” to enforce Title IX and (2) Franklin involved a suit against a local entity that lacked sovereign immunity.

 

            “While it may be appropriate for a court to engage in speculation to identify presumed remedies in an implied cause of action,” the court said, “such speculation and presumption is utterly inappropriate when evaluating a claim of sovereign immunity.” The court’s opinion suggests that remedies should be construed more narrowly under an express right of action than under an implied right of action. The court did not say whether damages would be available under RLUIPA in a suit against a local government, where sovereign immunity would not apply.

 

            The court also followed Allen in rejecting individual liability under RLUIPA, on the ground that only recipients of federal funds can be sued.

 

            Finally, the court refused to limit damages for Porter’s First Amendment claims. The PLRA bars suits “for mental or emotional injury” absent a physical injury, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Because punitive damages are not meant to remedy “mental or emotional injury” but to achieve deterrence, the court held they were not barred. Moreover, the court held § 1997e(e) inapplicable to First Amendment claims, because such claims are not based on mental or emotional injury but on injury to constitutional rights, and to apply the provision here “would effectively immunize prison officials” for First Amendment violations. This issue is also subject to a circuit split: Compare Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371 (5th Cir.2005) (does apply), with Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.1998) (does not apply).