Two courts find no waiver for RLUIPA damages

Federal district courts in California and Michigan held that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalize Persons Act (RLUIPA) waives states' immunity from suit, but not from liability for damages.

Williams v. Beltran, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2008 WL 3048860 (C.D.Cal., Aug 01, 2008) (NO. 03-7394-GHK).

A California federal district court held that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) cannot provide monetary damages because it does not provide unambiguous notice of states’ waiver of immunity regarding damages. The court followed the holding of the Fourth Circuit and rejected the holding of the Eleventh Circuit.  This was the only issue on which the court rejected a magistrate’s recommendations.

          Williams alleges that California’s prison grooming regulations force him to shave his beard in violation of his Muslim beliefs, and violate RLUIPA. The Act provides that individuals may sue for violations and “obtain appropriate relief.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(c), 2000cc-2(a). Circuit courts have agreed that RLUIPA conditions federal funds on a waiver of immunity, but split on whether it provides for damages. Relying on Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (Title IX), the Eleventh Circuit followed the general rule that courts should “presume the availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.” Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir.2007). The Fourth Circuit, however, held that the “appropriate relief” provision could not authorize damages against states, because a “waiver of sovereign immunity must extend unambiguously to such monetary claims.” Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118 (4th Cir. 2006).  See also Webman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 441 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C.Cir.2006) (no waiver for damages under similarly-phrased statute that preceded RLUIPA).

 

The district court here agreed with Madison: “The phrase ‘appropriate relief’ is ambiguous, and does not provide the express language or overwhelming implication that waiver of sovereign immunity requires. The ambiguity of this phrase is only corroborated by the disagreement of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits in interpreting its language. We conclude that a State need not submit to all remedies merely because it waives its immunity to some forms of relief by receiving federal funds.” It viewed Smith’s reliance on Franklin as inapposite, because Franklin involved a suit against a local government, where sovereign immunity did not apply.

 

The court also noted that the remedies provision of the Rehabilitation Act (mentioned in Franklin) “offers an example demonstrating that Congress is capable of being more explicit in drafting remedial clauses where the Eleventh Amendment is at issue.” That provision states that “remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available” against states to the same extent as they are available against private entities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2).

 

The recommending magistrate had contended that separately analyzing waiver in general and waiver for damages “makes redundant the Ex Parte Young doctrine” – but the court rejected this argument. The court stated that waiver under RLUIPA made possible suits for injunctive relief against the state itself, not just its officers. Moreover, potential overlap with Ex Parte Young, the court said, is no reason to ignore the requirement of explicit waiver.

 

The court cited Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996) (Rehabilitation Act), which made a similar distinction regarding federal immunity. The court took the view that it “should construe any waiver by a State under RLUIPA at least as restrictively as a federal waiver.” It reasoned that while “an expansive reading of a vague waiver is unlikely to do great harm [when] Congress can then unilaterally and explicitly narrow any such waiver,” “it strikes us as perverse to construe ambiguity against a sovereign that had no role in drafting the statute effecting such waiver.”

 

Porter v. Caruso, 2008 WL 3978972 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2008) (No. 1:05-cv-562).

A Michigan federal district court held that states’ waiver of immunity under the RLUIPA does not extend to liability for damages. The opinion0 suggests that courts should construe remedies under an express statutory right of action more narrowly than under an implied right of action. The court also held that RLUIPA does not permit individual liability, and that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PRLA) does not limit punitive damages or damages for First Amendment claims.

 

          Here, Porter brought RLUIPA and First Amendment claims regarding denial of access to an ankh, a symbol of his religion. The court was persuaded by Madison, finding two grounds for rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s its reliance on Franklin: (1) “the Franklin Court was engaged in the admittedly speculative task of attempting to define the remedies available in an implied right of action” to enforce Title IX and (2) Franklin involved a suit against a local entity that lacked sovereign immunity.

 

“While it may be appropriate for a court to engage in speculation to identify presumed remedies in an implied cause of action,” the court said, “such speculation and presumption is utterly inappropriate when evaluating a claim of sovereign immunity.” The court’s opinion suggests that remedies should be construed more narrowly under an express right of action than under an implied right of action. The court did not say whether damages would be available under RLUIPA in a suit against a local government, where sovereign immunity would not apply.

 

The court also followed Allen in rejecting individual liability under RLUIPA, on the ground that only recipients of federal funds can be sued.

 

Finally, the court refused to limit damages for Porter’s First Amendment claims. The PRLA bars suits “for mental or emotional injury” absent a physical injury, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Because punitive damages are not meant to remedy “mental or emotional injury” but to achieve deterrence, the court held they were not barred. Moreover, the court held § 1997e(e) inapplicable to First Amendment claims, because such claims are not based on mental or emotional injury but on injury to constitutional rights, and to apply the provision here “would effectively immunize prison officials” for First Amendment violations. This issue is also subject to a circuit split: Compare Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371 (5th Cir.2005) (does apply), with Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.1998) (does not apply).