N.D.Ohio: Section 8 termination procedures create § 1983 rights

An Ohio federal district court held that federal provisions governing termination procedures for Section 8 housing vouchers are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The relevant statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k), provides that the federal government shall create regulations for grievance procedures “under which tenants will have an opportunity” for access to relevant documents and an impartial decisionmaker. Stevenson v. Willis, No. 3:07CV3743 (N.D. Ohio Sep. 18, 2008).

 

          Following disputes with her landlord – in which the landlord “made unreasonable and unlawful demands” and accused her of damage to the unit – Amy Stevenson vacated her Section 8 apartment and her voucher was terminated. The hearing officer acted as both advocate for the housing authority and adjudicator, and relied on solely on hearsay. Stevenson claims violations of due process and of § 1437d(k) and its implementing regulations providing hearing procedures.

 

          Though recognizing that “the Supreme Court’s approach to § 1983 enforcement of federal statutes has generally been restrictive,” the court found § 1437d(k) enforceable. The court relied in part on Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevm’t & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987), and Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Parish, 442 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2006), which concerned Housing Act provisions relating to rent ceilings and utility allowances. “Stevenson’s right not to be arbitrarily terminated” from the program, said the court, “is hardly less important than her right to contest rent and utility charges.”

 

Turning to the specific statute here, the court noted that “[i]t imposes an unambiguous duty on public housing authorities to develop procedures that provide voucher holders with the right to an administrative hearing.” It cited other cases reaching the same conclusion. Gammons v. Mass. Dept. of Housing and Community Dev’mt, 523 F.Supp.2d 76 (D.Mass. 2007) (summary here); Fields v. Omaha Housing Authority, 2006 WL 176629 (D. Neb. 2006).

 

          Notably, the court did not specifically discuss whether § 1437d(k) contained “rights-creating language” under Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). However, the use of the phrase “under which tenants will,” in conjunction with specific procedural guarantees, likely constitutes sufficient rights-creating language because it focuses squarely on the individual tenant. Cf. Price v. City of Stockton, 390 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2004) (housing displacement assistance); Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2006) (Medicaid eligibility).