D.N.J.: Prisoner ADA suit goes forward under U.S. v. Georgia

New Jersey’s federal district court held that a prisoner’s American with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims of lack of reasonable access to his bunk and shower facilities alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment, and accordingly overcame state sovereign immunity. Because the case fell within the exception noted in United States v. Georgia, it was unnecessary for the court to consider whether Title II of the ADA validly abrogated state immunity as applied to claims that did not arise to the level of a constitutional violation in the context of prisons. This case illustrates correct application of Georgia, which has been incorrectly applied in other recent district court decisions (cited below). Muhammed v. Dept. of Corrections, 2008 WL 4911876 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2008) (No. 05-4999). The judge was Jerome Simandle (G.H.W. Bush). Mr. Muhammed brought claims under Title II of the ADA, claiming that he had been forced to move from the lower bunk of a first-floor, handicapped-accessible cell to the upper bunk of a second-floor cell. The parties disputed whether the move occurred over Muhammed’s disability-based objections or by his own request; for purposes of summary judgment, the court assumed it was made over his objections. The upshot of the move was that accessing Muhammed’s bunk was unsafe and painful, and that because of the locations and layouts of the prison showers he essentially lacked the ability to shower. The defendants did not dispute that Muhammed was a qualified person with a disability, and the court held that the record raised sufficient fact questions about the merits of his ADA claims to defeat summary judgment for the state. The remaining question was whether sovereign immunity barred these claims. The court correctly stated that under current Supreme Court precedent, Title II of the ADA abrogates state sovereign immunity for (1) state action that violates the Constitution, United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006), and (2) “some classes of state conduct that do not facially violate the constitution but are prohibited to ‘prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.’” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). (This description is borrowed from Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir.2006).) In Georgia, the Supreme Court instructed lower courts to assess, “on a claim-by-claim basis,” whether Title II claims fell in the first category (constitutional violation) – and if not, to then consider “whether Congress's purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.” Accordingly, the district court considered whether Muhammed’s claims, as alleged, amounted to a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims require (1) deliberate indifference to an inmate’s health or safety, and (2) a “sufficiently serious” deprivation of life’s necessities. The court held that “Plaintiff's evidence is clearly sufficient to raise a jury question as to [the deliberate-indifference prong],” because there was evidence that Muhammed was moved over specific objections regarding his disability, and had no apparent justification. The court viewed the sufficiently-serious prong as a more difficult question, but concluded that it was met here. Although (the court pointed out) the case law is rife with more egregious cases, the court stressed that “a remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993). Here, Muhammed’s alleged conditions “forc[ed] him to make the choice between encountering risk of further injury and taking no shower at all,” over a period of five months. The court further explained that, in view of this conclusion, “the Court need not undertake Georgia’s final step of assessing ‘insofar as [the alleged] misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress's purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.’” Accordingly, the court rejected defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In recent months, several district courts have misapplied Georgia, dismissing Title II claims that did not amount to constitutional violations without engaging in further analysis. Taylor v. Young, 2008 WL 4533915 (D.Utah Sep. 29, 2008) (student suit against university; summary here); Morris v. State Bar of California, 2008 WL 4067448 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2008) (attorney suit against state Bar), and Fox v. Poole, 2008 WL 1991103 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2008) (prisoner suit; summary here). The present decision is an encouraging example of a court getting Georgia right. Unfortunately, the few district courts that have proceeded to “Georgia’s final step” have concluded that Title II does not validly abrogate sovereign immunity in the context of non-constitutional claims in prisoner suits. Chase v. Baskerville, 508 F.Supp.2d 492 (E.D.Va. 2007) (summary here); Hale v. Mississippi, 2007 WL 3357562 (S.D.Miss. 2007) (summary here).

Because the case fell within the exception noted in United States v. Georgia, it was unnecessary for the court to consider whether Title II of the ADA validly abrogated state immunity as applied to claims that did not arise to the level of a constitutional violation in the context of prisons. This case illustrates correct application of Georgia, which has been incorrectly applied in other recent district court decisions (cited below). Muhammed v. Dept. of Corrections, 2008 WL 4911876 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2008) (No. 05-4999).

 

          Mr. Muhammed brought claims under Title II of the ADA, claiming that he had been forced to move from the lower bunk of a first-floor, handicapped-accessible cell to the upper bunk of a second-floor cell. The parties disputed whether the move occurred over Muhammed’s disability-based objections or by his own request; for purposes of summary judgment, the court assumed it was made over his objections. The upshot of the move was that accessing Muhammed’s bunk was unsafe and painful, and that because of the locations and layouts of the prison showers he essentially lacked the ability to shower. The defendants did not dispute that Muhammed was a qualified person with a disability, and the court held that the record raised sufficient fact questions about the merits of his ADA claims to defeat summary judgment for the state. The remaining question was whether sovereign immunity barred these claims.

 

The court correctly stated that under current Supreme Court precedent, Title II of the ADA abrogates state sovereign immunity for (1) state action that violates the Constitution, United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006), and (2) “some classes of state conduct that do not facially violate the constitution but are prohibited to ‘prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.’” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). (This description is borrowed from Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir.2006).) In Georgia, the Supreme Court instructed lower courts to assess, “on a claim-by-claim basis,” whether Title II claims fell in the first category (constitutional violation) – and if not, to then consider “whether Congress's purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.”  

 

Accordingly, the district court considered whether Muhammed’s claims, as alleged, amounted to a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims require (1) deliberate indifference to an inmate’s health or safety, and (2) a “sufficiently serious” deprivation of life’s necessities. The court held that “Plaintiff's evidence is clearly sufficient to raise a jury question as to [the deliberate-indifference prong],” because there was evidence that Muhammed was moved over specific objections regarding his disability, and had no apparent justification. The court viewed the sufficiently-serious prong as a more difficult question, but concluded that it was met here. Although (the court pointed out) the case law is rife with more egregious cases, the court stressed that “a remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993). Here, Muhammed’s alleged conditions “forc[ed] him to make the choice between encountering risk of further injury and taking no shower at all,” over a period of five months.

 

The court further explained that, in view of this conclusion, “the Court need not undertake Georgia’s final step of assessing ‘insofar as [the alleged] misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress's purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.’” Accordingly, the court rejected defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

 

In recent months, several district courts have misapplied Georgia, dismissing Title II claims that did not amount to constitutional violations without engaging in further analysis. Taylor v. Young, 2008 WL 4533915 (D.Utah Sep. 29, 2008) (student suit against university; summary here); Morris v. State Bar of California, 2008 WL 4067448 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2008) (attorney suit against state Bar), and Fox v. Poole, 2008 WL 1991103 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2008) (prisoner suit; summary here). The present decision is an encouraging example of a court getting Georgia right.

 

Unfortunately, the few district courts that have proceeded to “Georgia’s final step” have concluded that Title II does not validly abrogate sovereign immunity in the context of non-constitutional claims in prisoner suits. Chase v. Baskerville, 508 F.Supp.2d 492 (E.D.Va. 2007) (summary here); Hale v. Mississippi, 2007 WL 3357562 (S.D.Miss. 2007) (summary here).