D.Conn.: Sovereign immunity bars RLUIPA damages

Connecticut's federal district court held that damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) are barred by sovereign immunity.

The court said it “would easily conclude” that RLUIPA provides for damages if not for the clear statement rule imposed on waivers of sovereign immunity. In dicta, the court said the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) supported this result, though other courts have concluded that PLRA’s limitations do not apply to similar claims when brought under the First Amendment. El Badrawi v. Dept. of Homeland Security, --- F.Supp.2d ---, 2008 WL 4397657 (D.Conn. Sep. 22, 2008) (No. 3:07CV1074).

 

          El Badrawi brought constitutional, Federal Tort Claims Act and RLUIPA claims against DHS following his detention and agreement to leave the country in the face of likely deportation. He worked in biotechnology on an H1-B visa, but the government claimed unspecified national security reasons for deporting him. Prison officials denied El Badrawi’s request to take his meals on a schedule that allowed him to fast during Ramadan. He also asserted claims based on his detention itself and the medical treatment he received. The court refused to dismiss his constitutional and FTCA claims.

 

             There is a circuit split on damages under RLUIPA: Compare Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118 (4th Cir.2006) (no damages - summary here), with Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir.2007) (permitting damages - summary here)). The district court said it found Madison more persuasive because Allen “failed to account for the special clear statement rules that apply when the federal government seeks to abrogate state sovereign immunity.” The court noted that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be “unequivocal” and that “additionally,” terms of RLUIPA must be “unambiguously spelled out” because it is a Spending Clause statute. The court’s language implies that the Spending Clause nature of RLUIPA adds some additional stringency to the sovereign immunity rule, though it is not clear how these two clear-statement rules operate in tandem. In any event, it concluded that RLUIPA’s provision for “appropriate relief,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a), was not explicit enough to provide for damages.

 

          The court noted that Madison’s “analysis is also not wholly satisfying” because it (and courts following it) failed to discuss § 2000cc-2(f), which allows the federal government to sue “for injunctive or declaratory relief.” If “appropriate relief” in subsection (a) meant only injunctive and declaratory relief, the court asked, why would subsection (f) use more express language to say the same thing? This discrepancy would “easily” lead the court to conclude that “appropriate relief” includes damages, if it arose outside of the sovereign immunity context. But “even if that interpretation of RLUIPA is the ‘best’ one,” the applicable clear-statement rules required a contrary holding for the simple reason that “other interpretations of the phrase remain plausible.”

 

          In a footnote, the court found “further support” in RLUIPA’s statement that it should not be construed to amend or repeal the PLRA. The PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), states that prisoners cannot sue for damages “for mental or emotional injury” in the absence of physical injury. “Because religious deprivations will usually cause only mental or emotional injury,” the court opined, “the PLRA would presumably prohibit” damages for RLUIPA claims. It should be noted, however, that courts have split on whether the PLRA applies to religious exercise claims under the First Amendment, given that this would essentially immunize prison officials who violate religious freedom. Compare, e.g., Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371 (5th Cir.2005) (does apply), with Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.1998) (does not apply).