This pro se suit was brought by a widow who alleged that misconduct by the hospital and its staff led to her husband’s death. The district court dismissed all her federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state claims; the court “noted that Mrs. Turner may have a claim for medical malpractice and urged her to consult with counsel about filing a complaint in state court.” The circuit panel affirmed dismissal of all her claim, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(f)(1) and 1396a(w)(1).

            The court held that the § 1983 claim was not viable because the defendants were not state entities and the hospital’s receipt of federal funds was insufficient to establish action under color of state law. “As to Mrs. Turner’s claims under the Medicaid Act,” the court said, “she has given us no reason to believe that a private right of action exists under the specific sections to which she refers. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (reasoning that courts must have reason to believe that Congress intended to imply private right of action when statute does not include explicit one).”

            The short, nonprecedential order, the lack of oral argument in the case, and the fact that it was brought pro se suggest that the plaintiff may have failed to present any argument on the existence of a private right of action under the Medicaid provisions (whether implied in the statute or through § 1983). Thus, the court may have intended to reserve the question for future cases. It should be noted, however, that the requirements of both provisions are framed in terms of “maintain[ing] written policies and procedures with respect to all adult individuals receiving medical care” – language that could be difficult under either an implied right of action or § 1983 theory.