11th Cir.: No § 1983 rights in Weatherization Act

The Eleventh Circuit held that the federal Weatherization Act does not create rights enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The court said that the statute’s general statement of purpose and definitional sections could not support finding an individual right. The court also held that a Florida county’s exclusion of sex offenders from weatherization assistance did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Houston v. Williams, --- F.3d ---, 2008 WL 4793334 (11th Cir. Nob. 5, 2008) (No. 08-10288).

 

          The Energy Conservation and Production Act, 42 U.S.C. §§6851-6873, a.k.a. the Weatherization Act, provides for financial assistance to help low-income persons weatherize their homes. Federal regulations, 10 C.F.R. § 440.22, set financial eligibility as the sole criterion. Yet Brevard County, Florida makes ineligible for these benefits any person required to register as a sex offender. The court noted that the existence of § 1983 rights under the Act was an issue of first impression.

 

          Section 6861(b) states that the Act’s purpose is “to develop and implement a weatherization assistance program to increase the energy efficiency of dwellings owned or occupied by low income persons, reduce their total residential energy expenditures, and improve their health and safety.” Section 6863(a) directs the Secretary of Energy to make grants “for the purpose of providing financial assistance with regard to projects designed to provide for the weatherization of dwelling units… occupied by low-income families.” Houston argued that since this language limited the class of persons who could benefit under the Act, it constituted sufficient “rights-creating” language. The court disagreed. It called these sections “merely a statement of Congressional purpose describing the general zone of interest the statute is intended to protect,” rather than a statement of an individual right to weatherization benefits.

 

          The court also rejected Houston’s reliance on the Act’s definitions of “low-income,” “elderly,” and “handicapped,” saying that circuit precedent precluded finding enforceable rights based on definitional sections. 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003). The court further noted that “Congress gave the Secretary of Energy, not individuals, the right to take action against a state for non-compliance.” Finally, the court stated that since the statute contained no rights-creating language, a § 1983 action could not be predicated on language in the implementing regulations.

 

          The court also held that “the conservation of funds constitutes a rational basis on which to deny [weatherization] assistance to convicted felons and sex offenders.” The court pointed to other cases upholding the denial of government benefits to felons. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir.2005) (right to vote); Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419 (7th Cir.2000) (food stamps); Butler v. Apfel, 144 F.3d 622 (9th Cir.1998) (social security retirement benefits while incarcerated).

 

          Finally, the court held that the county rule did not violate the Ex Post Facto or Bill of Attainder Clauses because “neither determined guilt nor inflicted punishment.”