11th Cir.: Commerce Clause permits standalone tort preemption
The Eleventh Circuit held that Congress may use its Commerce Clause power to pass a law whose sole purpose and effect is to displace state tort law as it applies to rental car companies.Congress, it said, could reasonably conclude that state tort law was a substantial burden on interstate commerce. The court also held that the law at issue, known as the Graves Amendment, preempted a suit asserting strict liability against a rental car company for an accident caused by a lessee. Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, --- F.3d ---, 2008 WL 3842963 (11th Cir. Aug. 19, 2008) (No. 06-00220).
, a Carter
appointee.
This is the second circuit court this year to reject the
novel theory that Congress lacks the power to preempt state tort law in the
absence of any federal regulatory scheme. The Second Circuit upheld a law
preempting suits against gun manufacturers in City of New York v. Beretta USA
Corp., 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary here ).
Garcia's spouse was killed in a collision with a Vanguard vehicle driven by a
lessee. Like many states, Florida common law imposes strict liability on a car
owner when a driver to whom the car was entrusted negligently causes an
accident. Garcia's wrongful death action was consolidated with a declaratory
judgment action by Vanguard, and the district court held that the Graves
Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, validly preempted Garcia's suit. Appended to the
2005 transportation appropriations bill, the Amendment expressly preempts all
vicarious liability in state courts for rental car companies. Another district
court held the Amendment unconstitutional. Vanguard Care Rental USA v. Huchon,
532 F.Supp.2d 1371 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 14, 2007) (summary here ).
The appeals court rejected Garcia's argument that her claim fell within the
Graves Amendment's saving clause for "financial responsibility or insurance
standards." The court reasoned that a "financial responsibility" law in this
context meant one that was similar to an insurance standard, not a theory of
tort liability. Otherwise, "the exception would swallow the rule."
Regarding the constitutional question, the court noted that the commerce power
extends to three categories of activities: channels of interstate commerce;
instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and intrastate activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995). The court said that the Graves Amendment does not fall in the first
category, because it does not regulate roads as such. The court noted some
authority indicating that "methods of interstate transportation and
communication are per se instrumentalities of commerce," but said, "the
implications of this argument give us reason to doubt its premise." Congress
would have plenary power over "many aspects of automobile use," including
traffic rules and licensing drivers. Accordingly, other authority indicates that
Congress's power to regulate modes of transportation and communication derives
from the third Lopez category.
As to this "substantial effect"
category, the court distinguished between economic and noneconomic activities.
Whereas Congress cannot regulate noneconomic activity based solely on its
aggregate economic impact, e.g. Lopez, it needs only a "rational basis" for
regulating economic activities, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
Garcia argued that the Graves Amendment regulated only state tort law
(noneconomic) rather than the rental car market (economic). But the court called
this "a distinction without a difference, as the state tort law preempted by the
statute regulates the rental car markets; in other words, the effect of the
statute is to deregulate the rental car market." There is "no question" that car
rentals substantially affect interstate commerce, due to "the size and national
scope of the industry," and because rental cars are so frequently driven between
states.
The court acknowledged that it is "relatively novel" for
Congress to pass a law "with the sole purpose and effect of preempting state-law
claims," noting that the only other example it was aware of was the law upheld
in Beretta USA. Nevertheless, the court said that "so long as the
underlying economic activity the federal statute aims to protect is within the
commerce power, we will not second guess Congress's decision that preemption is
an appropriate means to achieve proper ends."
Whatever the merits of
imposing vicarious liability on rental car companies, both the Graves Amendment
and the gun law in Beretta USA represent a disturbing strategy by a
Republican Congress, which is now deemed constitutional: to eliminate individual
claims under state law, not because they conflict with any federal scheme, but
simply to protect business.