The court stated that this was the “unambiguous intent” of the statute, and refused to consider the legislative history or the Attorney General’s contrary interpretation.

The court considered an issue that has split the district and circuit courts. Compare Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil and Water Conserv. Dist., 133 F.3d 816 (11th Cir.1998) (Title II permits employment claims), with Zimmerman v. Oregon Dep't of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir.1999) (only Title I permits employment claims); cf. also Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir.1997) (Title III (Public Accommodations) does not permit employment claims). Supreme Court dicta, however, raised the possibility that Title II may exclude employment claims. See Bd. of Trs. Of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 n. 1 (2001).

Canfield was employed as a deputy sheriff before on-the-job injuries rendered him physically disabled. The Cass County Sheriff’s Department refused to return him to active duty or to accommodate his disability. Canfield sued under the ADA, but could not meet Title I’s exhaustion requirement because he had never filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Canfield argued that his claim fell within Title II, and therefore exhaustion was not required.

The court recognized that most courts have found no exhaustion requirement under Title II of the ADA, citing precedent from the Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits. It further noted that regulations promulgated by the Attorney General interpreted Title II as including employment-related claims. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.140(a). The court noted, however, that before giving deferential consideration to regulations interpreting a statute, it should “first determine whether Congress has unambiguously expressed its intent on the issue at bar,” citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

Title II prohibits “exclu[sion] from participation in or [denial of] the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” The court concluded that “‘employment’ is plainly not a ‘service, program or activity’ of a public entity,” as such a construction “strains the ordinary meaning of those words.” It agreed with the Ninth Circuit that “services, programs or activities” means “outputs” of a public entity – those things they provide to the public – whereas employment is an “input” it uses to produce “outputs.”

The above-quoted sentence in Title II also stated that individuals shall not “”be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Despite the arguably broader wording of this clause, the court held it did not include employment discrimination within “discrimination by any such entity,” for several reasons. First, it noted that Title II’s definition of “qualified individuals with a disability” refers to persons to “meet[ ] the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities,” language it viewed as incompatible with including employment. It also noted the difference in Title I’s definition of the same term, which refers to employment explicitly. Additionally, it stated that “reading Title II to encompass employment claims would make Title I almost completely redundant with respect to public employees, and would result in eliminating Title I’s exhaustion requirement” – a result inconsistent with the canon that no part of a statute should be understood to be purely superfluous. Finally, the court noted that Congress assigned regulatory authority for Title I and Title II to two different agencies – the EEOC and the Attorney General – a move that, if Title II included employment, “would subject public employees to conflicting regulations.”

Although calling the question “a close one,” the court concluded “the plain language of the statute forbids me to resort to legislative history or to defer to [Department of Justice] regulations.”