Third Circuit 1983/IDEA/504 decision

The Third Circuit, reversing its own prior precedent, ignored legislative history and interpreted a § 1983 legislative fix extremely narrowly, demonstrating that any future legislative action regarding § 1983 must be broadly worded to avoid distortion by the courts and the denial of access to the courts. A dyslexic former student sued the Jersey City Public Schools (JCPS) and New Jersey officials both in their official and personal capacities alleging that the officials failed to comply with federal law and, as a result, deprived him of a free, appropriate public education. He alleged that the school officials conducted an inadequate investigation regarding whether he had dyslexia and then failed to provide appropriate services for his dyslexia. He sought to use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to remedy alleged violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. He did not bring his claims directly under the IDEA or Section 504. The district court found in his favor based on Third Circuit precedent. The Third Circuit unanimously reversed in an en banc decision, explicitly overturning its earlier ruling based on recent Supreme Court caselaw. A.W. v. The Jersey Public Schools, 2007 WL 1500335, No. 05-2553 (3d Cir. May 24, 2007).

The Third Circuit began by stating that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the appellate court had jurisdiction to address the denial of qualified immunity.  The court of appeals found that as part of its review of qualified immunity, it had jurisdiction to conduct “an inquiry into the availability of relief and the existence of a cause of action.”

 

In its prior decision, W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995), the Third Circuit had been swayed by the legislative history of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) of the IDEA which included House Reports explicitly stating that the purpose of the amendment of the IDEA was to clarify that the statute could be enforced via § 1983.  The Third Circuit’s earlier ruling had also been heavily influenced by the Supreme Court’s statement in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992), that “we presume the availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.”

 

The recent decision of the Third Circuit noted that the circuits are split on whether the IDEA may be enforced via § 1983.  The Third Circuit changed its mind and reversed Matula based in large part upon the Supreme Court case of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005).

 

It was not disputed, and the court held that the IDEA satisfied the criteria for a cause of action under § 1983 set forth in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002).  The court stated that “the IDEA creates individually enforceable rights in the class of beneficiaries to which A.W. belongs.  Therefore, we presume that Congress intended § 1983 to be an available remedy for violations of the IDEA.”   However, the court held that under the guidance of Rancho Palos Verdes, if there is an express, private means of redress in the IDEA itself, this could indicate that Congress did NOT intended to permit a more expansive remedy under § 1983.  The court noted that the IDEA provides for an administrative hearing that can be appealed to federal court.  The court found that the IDEA’s scheme of providing an administrative hearing and appeal to court constitutes “an express, private means of redress.  This, then, means that a § 1983 action is not available to remedy violations of IDEA-created rights, absent some ‘textual indication, express or implicit, that the [statutory] remedy is to complement, rather than supplant § 1983’” (quoting Rancho Palos Verdes).

 

The text of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) references remedies available under the Constitution and “other statutes protecting the rights of disabled children.”  The Third Circuit agreed with the Fourth Circuit that § 1983 speaks generally, without mentioning disability or youth, and therefore was not textually referenced in § 1415(l).  Sellers v. School Board of Manassas, Virginia, 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998).

 

The Third Circuit then addressed whether section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act could be enforced via § 1983.  The court noted that the Rehabilitation Act adopts the remedies in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The court stated that “Section 504’s remedial scheme is far less detailed than the IDEA’s remedial scheme.”  Nevertheless, the court observed that the Supreme Court has found an implied private right of action to address Title VI, and therefore Section 504.  The Third Circuit held that the implied private right of action precluded relief under § 1983.  The court explained: “Following Rancho Palos Verdes, we will ordinarily infer that when a private, judicial remedy is available for alleged statutory violations, this remedy is intended to be exclusive.”  The court concluded that there “is no showing that the remedial scheme in Section 405 was intended ‘to complement, rather than supplant, § 1983’” (quoting Rancho Palos Verdes).

 

The Third Circuit remanded the case to the district court for entry of judgment in favor of defendants.