S.Ct. Holds Parents Can Sue Pro Se Under IDEA

Parents of children with disabilities were victorious in a Supreme Court case involving the right of parents to litigate pro se on behalf of their children under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The Court held that the issue was resolved by looking at the text of the IDEA. However, the Court did not base its conclusion on one specific provision. Instead, the Court held that “a proper interpretation of the Act requires a consideration of the entire statutory scheme.” The Court dismissed the state’s contention that they would be subjected to frivolous suits, if parents are permitted to represent themselves. The Court noted that states have the power to seek attorneys’ fees from losing parents, and therefore concluded that the impact on state treasuries would be minimal. Winkelman v. Parma City School District, 2007 WL 1461151, No. 05-983 (May 21, 2007). The Court opinion was written by Justice Kennedy. Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the result and dissented.

The case contains a very helpful formulation of the connection between rights and remedies.  The Court stated that the dissent’s approach of not permitting parents to appeal pro se the school placement of the child, “leaves some parents without a remedy,” in which case the “potential for injustice is apparent.”

 

The local school district had recommended placement of the Winkelman’s autistic son in a public elementary school.  The parents disagreed with that placement and paid for their son to attend a private school.  The parents appealed the school’s decision through the administrative process and lost.  They then filed suit in the district court, representing themselves, and lost.  They appealed pro se to the Sixth Circuit.  The Sixth Circuit dismissed their appeal without considering the merits, holding that the rights conferred by the IDEA belong to the child, and therefore nonlawyer parents could not proceed pro se in court.  The Sixth Circuit’s ruling conflicted with the decision of the First Circuit.

 

The Supreme Court began by noting that since the school district accepts federal funds to pay for the education of children with disabilities, “it must comply with IDEA’s mandates.”  The Court set forth multiple provisions in the IDEA conferring rights on parents to participate in the procedures to determine the educational placement and services for the child.  The Court then observed: “The parents enjoy enforceable rights at the administrative stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert these rights in federal court.”

 

The Court relied heavily on the wording of the purpose of the IDEA, which includes ensuring “that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.”  20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B).  The Court observed that the “grammatical structure would make no sense” if the IDEA did not confer independent rights on parents.  The Court found that other provisions presume “parents have rights of their own,” and any contrary interpretation would be “far too strained to be correct.”  The Court cited case law from the 1920s for the “proposition” that “parents have a recognized legal interest in the education and upbringing of their children.”

 

The Court rejected the dissent’s approach of interpreting the IDEA to grant parents rights only to procedures and reimbursement, but not to a specific school placement for the child.  The Court stated: “The status of parents as parties is not limited to matters that relate to procedure and cost recovery.  To find otherwise would be inconsistent with the collaborative framework and expansive system of review established by the Act.”  The Court stated that were it to try to distinguish the rights of parents and children, this “would impose upon parties a confusing and onerous legal regime, one worsened by the absence of any express guidance in IDEA.”

 

The state argued that the IDEA did not provide “clear notice” of the state’s liability, as required for Spending Clause statutes, highlighting the conflict between the circuit courts.  The state relied upon Arlington Central School District Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. ___ (2006), which interpreted the attorneys’ fees provision of the IDEA.

 

 The Supreme Court rejected the contention that its ruling would place “any substantive condition or obligation” on the states.  The Court stated that the “basic measure of monetary recovery … is not expanded by recognizing that some rights repose in both the parent and the child.”

 

The state argued that its litigation costs would increase due to the added expense of defending against suits “unconstrained by attorneys trained in the law and the rule of ethics.”  The Court responded: “Effects such as these do not suffice to invoke the concerns under the Spending Clause.”  Moreover, the Court noted that under the IDEA, the state could seek attorneys’ fees from parents who file an appeal “for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III).  The Court stated that the provision permitting states to get attorneys’ fees from parents would provide “some relief” for the states.

 

Since the Court held that the parents were representing their own interests, there was no question that the parents could proceed pro se.

 

The dissent by Justices Scalia and Thomas argues that if there is a right without a remedy, “that complaint is properly addressed to Congress.”