7th Cir. Rejects Taxpayer Standing

The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of taxpayer standing to allege violations of the Establishment Clause in the context of the military’s support for the Jamboree of the Boy Scouts of America. The court concluded that the taxpayers did not have standing to challenge the federal statute that requires the United States military to assist with the Boy Scouts’ national event, because the statute is authorized by Congress’s power under the Military Clauses and Property Clause of the Constitution instead of the Taxing and Spending Clause. Winkler v. Gates, 481 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. April 4, 2007).

The military spends approximately 6 to 8 million dollars on the Boy Scouts’ Jamboree, which occurs once every 4 years.  These expenditures are all in services provided by the military, including equipment and labor by soldiers in constructing a tent city.  In response to the district court’s injunction enjoining the military from supporting the Jamboree, Congress passed a statute clarifying that the Jamboree is a training event for the Armed Forces, simulating the preparation, logistics, and leadership required for combat.  The military also justified its expenditures as funds spent for recruitment and public relations.  In reversing the district court’s injunction based on a finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the court of appeals stated:

 

Although [plaintiff] questions whether the military is investing its time and money wisely when it uses the Jamboree to further its broader goals, that concern is far removed from the Establishment Clause.  Furthermore, a court is poorly equipped to second-guess the military’s own assessment of the benefits of the Jamboree.  In a time when the armed forces regularly spend significant funds both for recruitment and public relations, Congress’s decision to authorize them to take advantage of a built-in audience of potential recruits is reasonably related to the activities authorized by the Military Clauses.

 

Since the court viewed the military’s support of the Jamboree as justified by Congress’s power under the Military Clauses of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14, and its use of equipment as justified by Congress’s power under the Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, the court held that under prior Supreme Court precedent, taxpayer standing was lacking. 

 

The court characterizes Supreme Court caselaw as establishing two different “strands” of standing jurisprudence: “Article III standing, which enforces the Constitution’s case or controversy requirement, and prudential standing, which embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.”  (Citations omitted.)  The court describes the taxpayer standing line of cases as involving prudential principles of standing.

 

The concurrence disputes the majority’s characterization of Supreme Court case law as permitting taxpayer standing based on prudential considerations.  The concurrence argues that Supreme Court caselaw “should not be understood to have relaxed the injury-in-fact and redressability requirements of constitutional standing in Establishment Clause cases.”

 

The issue of whether taxpayer standing is “prudential” has relevance for the Seventh Circuit taxpayer standing case currently before the Supreme Court.  Freedom from Religion Foundation Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. granted sub nom. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation Inc., 127 S.Ct. 722 (2006).  The majority decision acknowledges the Supreme Court appeal but states in a footnote that the issues in the appeal are different from this case and will not determine the outcome in this case.