EDNY finds no 1983 rights in LIHEAA

The District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled against plaintiffs in a class action concerning emergency benefits under the Home Energy Assistance Program (“E-HEAP”), holding that the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act (LIHEAA), 42 U.S.C. § 8624(b)(13), does not create rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the procedures employed by the state in administering E-HEAP are constitutionally adequate and no continuing due process violation exists warranting prospective relief; and any retroactive relief for past due process is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Boyland v. Wing, 2007 WL 951870, Case No. 92-CV-1002 (E.D.N.Y. March 27, 2007).

A related case regarding non-emergency benefits had gone to the Second Circuit.  Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2005).  The state argued that the named plaintiffs lack standing, because they had not sought E-HEAP benefits during the preceding three years.  The court rejected that argument.  The court stated that the plaintiff had not received compensation for the allegedly improper denial of benefits, and therefore their claims present a live controversy.  The court also stated that even if their claims were moot, the plaintiff class would still have standing.  The court quoted Supreme Court and Second Circuit cases for the rule that class representatives may continue to represent a class even if their individual claims become moot.

 

The court noted that in the Kapps v. Wing case, the Second Circuit explicitly declined to address whether LIHEAA created rights enforceable under section 1983.   The Second Circuit observed that LIHEAA has many of the characteristics important to the creation of privately enforceable statutory rights, but the Supreme Court “has appeared to be increasingly reluctant to find § 1983-enforceable rights in statutes which, like the LIHEAA, set forth their requirements in the context of delineating the obligations that accompany participation in federal spending clause programs.”  The Second Circuit made reference to “the aftermath of the Court’s decision in Gonzaga University” v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), and decided the case on constitutional due process grounds instead.  424 F.3d at 127. 

 

The district court cited three court of appeals cases addressing the issue prior to Gonzaga.  The Fourth and Sixth Circuits had held that LIHEAA conferred no rights enforceable under section 1983; the Eighth Circuit held to the contrary.  The district court in NY found the decisions of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits persuasive.  The court noted that LIHEAA does not establish an entitlement program, but rather provides a lump sump to be distributed to eligible households until the funds run out.  The court noted that the statute does not contain “the customary ‘shall’ language utilized when Congress is imposing mandatory obligations and evincing an intent to create new rights; instead the Act provides that the participating state ‘give assurances’ that the state will meet the established [federal] conditions.”  The court concluded “that there is nothing in the language or the structure of LIHEAA that unambiguously confers a private right enforceable in an action under Section 1983 and, therefore, no such cause of action exists.”

 

The court held that plaintiffs have a protected property interest in E-HEAP benefits, but that they were receiving constitutionally adequate due process.  The court recited at length the state’s recent policy directives that changed the state’s policies to comply with federal law.  The court stated that the plaintiffs had failed to offer any evidence that the current City procedures and practices improperly deny E-HEAP benefits.

 

Since the Court held that there was no existing violation of due process, the only possible relief would address prior violations.  Plaintiffs sought corrective payments to address prior illegal denial of benefits.  The district court held that corrective payments would violate the Eleventh Amendment.  The court analyzed whether the city was acting as an arm of the state in administering E-HEAP.  The court cited Second Circuit precedent, Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 1995), that had already held that for the HEAP program, the local social services districts act as an arm of the state.  The primary factors were that the state was responsible for all expenditures and the local districts had no policymaking discretion.  The court held that there were no important distinctions between HEAP and E-HEAP.  For both programs, funds came from the state, not local, treasury, and the state had sole policymaking discretion.