5th Cir. finds 11th Am immunity in Rehab Act

The Fifth Circuit held that the State of Texas had Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under the private right of action contained in section 102 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 722(c)(5)(J)(i). The court held that this conclusion was consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985). The court noted that Congress had enacted a legislative fix to Atascadero. However, the court found that the fix was limited to section 504 of the act and was inapplicable to section 102. Hurst v. Texas Dep’t of Assistive and Rehabilitative Services, 2007 WL 890927, No. 05-51656 (5th Cir. Mar. 26, 2007).

The suit was brought under the Vocational Rehabilitation Program of Title I of the Rehabilitation Act.  The plaintiff alleged that she was incorrectly denied medical treatment by the Texas Department of Assistive and Rehabilitative Services (DARS).  The statute contains an explicit private right of action, providing that any party aggrieved by a final decision may bring a civil action in state or federal court.  29 U.S.C. § 722(c)(5)(J)(i).  The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that Congress had not clearly declared its intent to condition the State’s receipt of federal funds upon the State’s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

 

The Fifth Circuit stated that no federal circuit court had addressed the specific issue in the case of whether section 102 of the Rehabilitation Act provides a clear statement of intent to require a state to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity in order to receive federal funds.  The court stated: “Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court has addressed this issue in regard to a different section of the Rehabilitation Act with language very similar to that used in § 722.”  The court followed the Atascadero case, which held that a general authorization for suit in federal court is not sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. 

 

The court noted in a footnote that in “response to Atascadero, Congress passed additional legislation including a clear-statement of its intent to condition the receipt of federal funds upon a State’s waiver of sovereign immunity for liability incurred under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”  However, since that legislative fix was limited to section 504 (and some other statutes), and did not explicitly include section 102, Congress’ response to Atascadero was irrelevant to the Fifth Circuit.  The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s argument was “indistinguishable from the argument rejected in Atascadero and the statutory language at issue in this case is similarly indistinguishable from the language at issue in Atascadero.”

 

This case highlights the limitations of a narrow legislative fix targeted to a specific Supreme Court holding.  It demonstrates that the courts will not broadly interpret Congressional disapproval of the Supreme Court’s reasoning.  Instead, remedial legislation will be narrowly construed and the Supreme Court’s reasoning will be broadly followed for all provisions not specifically enumerated in the fix.