IDEA Spending Clause case

The First Circuit issued a lengthy decision addressing whether a bright girl with Asperger’s Syndrome qualified for special education and related services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400. The school district interpreted the IDEA in such a way as to conclude that she was not eligible for services. The school district lost that argument. Then the school district argued that the IDEA failed to put states on notice that as a condition of accepting federal money under the IDEA, they are required to provide benefits to children such as the plaintiff. The First Circuit held that the relevant provision of the IDEA “does not offend the Spending Clause by springing hidden liabilities upon participating states.” Mr. I. ex. rel. L.I. v. Maine School Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. Mar. 5, 2007).

The First Circuit issued a lengthy decision addressing whether a bright girl with Asperger’s Syndrome qualified for special education and related services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400.  The school district interpreted the IDEA in such a way as to conclude that she was not eligible for services.  The school district lost that argument.  Then the school district argued that the IDEA failed to put states on notice that as a condition of accepting federal money under the IDEA, they are required to provide benefits to children such as the plaintiff.  The First Circuit held that the relevant provision of the IDEA “does not offend the Spending Clause by springing hidden liabilities upon participating states.”  Mr. I. ex. rel. L.I. v. Maine School Admin. Dist. No. 55, 2007 WL 641988 (1st Cir. Mar. 5, 2007).  The three judge panel consisted of judges appointed by Reagan, Bush I, and Bush II.

 

The substance of the dispute was whether the district had to provide services to a child whose disabling condition had merely an “adverse effect” on her educational performance, as distinguished from a “significant impact” on educational performance.  Based on the clear language of the IDEA and Maine law (which was changed during the course of the litigation but didn’t help the school for this case), the First Circuit held that an “adverse effect” was sufficient and the child was entitled to services.

 

The school district then argued that the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(a)(i), fails to provide notice to the states that they are required to provide benefits to children whose conditions have merely an “adverse effect” on their educational performance.  The court of appeals noted that Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 126 S.Ct. 2455 (2006), held that “when Congress attaches conditions to a State’s acceptance of federal funds pursuant to its Spending Clause authority, the conditions must be set out unambiguously so that each state can intelligently decide whether to take the money and its accompanying obligations.”  (Internal quotations omitted.)  The school district contended that by using the word “disability,” the IDEA limited the school’s duty to children whose conditions “significantly impact educational performance.”  The First Circuit rejected the school’s argument, focusing on the definition of the word “disability” in the IDEA.  The court found that the definition of “disability” in the IDEA did not include the qualifying language sought by the school district.  The court held that the more restrictive meaning of the word “disability” in Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act “is of little moment.” 

 

The court then reviewed the legislative history of the IDEA.  The court noted that in 1997, Congress voiced concern about over identifying children as disabled and, as a result, changed the formula for calculating the funds due each state.  The legislative history included the statement that the change in the funding formula “should in no way be construed to modify the obligation of educational agencies to identify and serve students with disabilities.”  The court stated: “although the district and its amici argue that an over-identification problem persists, we cannot tighten the standard for IDEA eligibility when Congress itself has chosen not to do so.” 

 

The court noted in a footnote that in 2002, a presidential committee report strongly criticized the regulatory definitions of the disabilities recognized by the IDEA.  The court concluded: “Because neither Congress nor the Department of Education appears to have acted on the commission’s recommendations, however, the report is of little use in construing the eligibility standards that have endured.” The court found that the legislative history “strengthens our conviction” that the IDEA “does not offend the Spending Clause by springing hidden liabilities upon participating states.”

 

While the court held that the child was entitled to services, the court denied the parents reimbursement for the private school the child attended, because the private school did not provide any of the special education services that were recommended to address the child’s disability.