11th Cir. upholds 1983 enforcement in Driver Privacy case

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the Driver Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725, is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The DPPA has an explicit private right of action. Nevertheless, the court held that the statute is enforceable not only under the statutory cause of action but also under section 1983. Collier v. Dickinson, 2007 WL 437370 (11th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007).

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the Driver Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725, is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The DPPA has an explicit private right of action.  Nevertheless, the court held that the statute is enforceable not only under the statutory cause of action but also under section 1983.  Collier v. Dickinson, 2007 WL 437370 (11th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007).  The panel consists of a Bush I appointee, a Clinton appointee and a Carter appointee.

 

Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that executive-level officials at the Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) sold personal information that plaintiffs provided in order to obtain their drivers’ licenses and/or vehicle registrations to mass marketers, in violation of the DPPA.  The district court dismissed the case, holding that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity.

 

The Eleventh Circuit explained that in order to evaluate whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, the court must first evaluate whether plaintiffs’ allegations, if true, establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right.  The court rejected plaintiffs’ claim to a constitutional right to privacy. 

 

However, the court upheld plaintiffs’ statutory claims.  The DPPA clearly prohibits the release of personal information contained in individual motor vehicle records unless the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains.  18 U.S.C. § 2721(a).  The statute contains two enforcement mechanisms.  First, the Attorney General can subject a department of motor vehicles that has a policy or practice of substantial noncompliance to a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 per day for each day of substantial noncompliance.  Second, the DPPA has a private right of action.  18 U.S.C. § 2724(a).  The court concluded that aggrieved individuals could sue persons who disclose their personal information in violation of the DPPA, utilizing this private right of action.

 

Moreover, the court held that section 1983 provides a cause of action to enforce the DPPA.  The court noted that the DPPA enforcement provision, specifically the private right of action, focuses on benefiting individuals.  The court found the DPPA’s protections of personal information to be clear and specific, since consent of individuals is required before information may be released and the private right of action makes it clear that an individual who knowingly violates the statute is liable to the individuals to whom the information pertains.  The court rejected the defendants’ contention that Congress intended to preclude relief under § 1983, by creating an enforcement scheme incompatible with § 1983.  The Eleventh Circuit quoted Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) and stated: “Rarely is a ‘remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to supplant § 1983.  Indeed, to support the conclusion that Section 1983 relief is precluded, the scheme set forth by Congress must be so detailed, complex, or comprehensive, such that it is nonsensical to hold that Congress intended Section 1983 relief to be available.”  The court found the relief offered by the DPPA and section 1983 to be “complementary.”

 

The court then found that the officials had clear notice that their actions were prohibited by law and held that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity.