2d Cir. Consent Decree Interpretation Case

The Second Circuit held, in a 2:1 decision, that the plain meaning of a consent decree did not bar the state from changing its law and thereby changing its treatment of the plaintiffs. The case involved a procedural due process challenge to New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act focusing on the lack of any procedures for hearings. The consent decree explicitly set forth the number of years offenders were subjected to a registration requirement. New York subsequently changed its statute to lengthen the time offenders had to comply with the registration requirement. The Second Circuit held that while agreeing to the consent decree, the State had not intended to surrender its “inherent authority …to modify state statutory law.” Doe v. Pataki, 481 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. March 8, 2007).

The Second Circuit held, in a 2:1 decision, that the plain meaning of a consent decree did not bar the state from changing its law and thereby changing its treatment of the plaintiffs.  The case involved a procedural due process challenge to New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act focusing on the lack of any procedures for hearings.  The consent decree explicitly set forth the number of years offenders were subjected to a registration requirement.  New York subsequently changed its statute to lengthen the time offenders had to comply with the registration requirement.  The Second Circuit held that while agreeing to the consent decree, the State had not intended to surrender its “inherent authority …to modify state statutory law.”  Doe v. Pataki, 2007 WL 705031 (2d Cir. March 8, 2007).  The two judges in the majority were appointed by Carter and Clinton.  The dissenting judge was appointed by Clinton.

 

The majority acknowledged that the change in the length of time for registration conflicted with the consent decree’s requirement.  The majority stated: “there is no dispute as to the meaning of the words in [the consent decree], e.g. ‘ten years’ means ‘ten years.’”  However, the court found that more important than the words in the decree is “whether the parties intended to place those words in the agreement as part of a resolution of disputed matters for which the parties had bargained, or only to illustrate the provisions of then-existing state law.”  The court observed that the duration of registration requirement was not challenged in any claim in the lawsuit.  The court next held that there was no “objective evidence” that the duration requirement was the subject of bargaining between the parties.  Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that it was a “key part of the parties’ bargain,” though he conceded that it had not been “bargained over.”  The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument, citing “traditional concerns regarding a federal court’s authority to restrict a state’s inherent powers.”  While the court conceded that a state could agree in a consent decree not to alter a provision of then-existing state law, “proper regard for state authority requires a federal court to have a clear indication that a state has intended to surrender its normal authority to amend its statutes.” 

 

The dissent emphasized the clear language of the consent decree and deference to the findings of fact by the district court that the state had agreed to and bargained for the terms of the consent decree.  The dissent also expressed concern that the majority altered precedent for interpreting consent decrees due to the fact that one of the parties is a state.