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Sovereign Immunity of States Does Not Protect Counties
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Jinks v. Richland County, South Carolina, 2003 WL 1906299 (Apr. 22, 2003). 28 U.S.C. § 1367 grants supplemental jurisdiction in federal courts to state law claims which are related to a federal claim brought in federal court. If the federal claims is dismissed, the district court may dismiss the state claims without prejudice, in which case the statute of limitations on the state claim is tolled until 30 days after dismissal in federal court. § 1367(d).
In Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota,122 S. Ct. 999 (Feb.27, 2002), the Court held that when state law claims against nonconsenting States are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds serious doubts are raised about the constitutionality of the provision given principles of state sovereign immunity. Therefore, the opinion applies the clear statement rule, that when Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government it must make that intent unmistakably clear in the statute. Since the statute makes no specific reference to suits against states, it does not apply to such suits.
Relying on Raygor and principles of federalism under the Tenth Amendment, the South Carolina Supreme Court found the tolling provisions as applied to counties unconstitutional. The essence of that ruling was that the statute was a regulation of practice and procedure in state courts, a matter beyond the power of Congress. 563 S.E. 2d 104 (2002).
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed, resting on the usually quiescent Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The Clause itself is not an independent grant of power but rather authority to pass laws to carry out powers otherwise granted to the federal government by the Constitution.
Since Congress has power to establish federal courts, all that is required under the Clause is that the legislation be conducive to the administration of justice. The opinion then gives several reasons why the tolling provision meets this test. The statute is therefore necessary.
The Court then finds the tolling is also proper, in that it is not a violation of state sovereignty by regulating procedure in state courts. To the extent the procedure/substance dichotomy is applicable, the tolling provision in 1367 falls on the substantive side, just as statutes of limitation are substantive for purposes of diversity cases under Erie v. Tompkins. There is no greater intrusion on state sovereignty here than the undisputed power of Congress to override state-law immunity when subjecting a municipality to suit under a federal cause of action…a State's authority to set the conditions upon which its political subdivision are subject to suit in its own courts must yield to the enactments of Congress.
The Court also rejects an argument that the unmistakenly clear requirement applicable to states should apply to political subdivisions. Unlike suits against states, there is no constitutional doubt as to Congressional power over suits against subdivisions.
One interesting aspect of the decision is the lack of any inquiry to the legislative history to determine the objectives of § 1367. Rather, the Court simply offers its own justifications, relying on other judicial pronouncements about the section. This approach is in marked contrast to the requirement imposed by the five activist/conservative Justices when determining whether Congress acted within its legislative powers under the 14th Amendment. When determining whether Congress had power under the Equal Protection Clause to abrogate state sovereign immunity, the majority requires a legislative history explicitly demonstrating a pattern of conduct by States prohibited by the 14th Amendment. See Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
Congressional Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause
In recent years, federalism issues have focused primarily on Congressional power under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment and issues relating to sovereign immunity of the states. But another line of cases raise issues of Congressional power to legislate under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. It provides that Congress shall have Power…to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution all the powers vested in the Government of the United States. The Clause itself is not an independent grant of power but rather authority to pass laws to carry out powers otherwise granted to the federal government by the Constitution. The Clause is frequently used in conjunction with Spending Power legislation.
Congress passed legislation making it a crime to bribe any agent of a state or local government if the public entity receives at least $10,000 in a year from the federal government. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2). As interpreted by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Sabri, 2003 WL 17922150 (8th Cir. Apr. 7, 2003), there is no requirement in the statute that there be a connection between the offensive conduct and federal funds. Thus, bribery of a city official in a local zoning application which involves no federal funds is a federal offense if the city receives $10,000 in federal funding for any purpose in the year in question.
The defendant in a bribery case asserted that Congress had no power to enact the statute absent a nexus between the criminal activity and federal funds. The 8th Circuit first finds that the statute is not a condition on the receipt of federal funds, providing federal power under the Spending Clause. The statute places no obligation on the recipient of federal funds, but rather regulates the conduct of third parties receiving no federal funds.
However, the court then holds that the statute is a necessary and proper exercise of Congressional power under the Spending Clause. The Necessary and Proper Clause enables Congress to enact all laws which are convenient to the exercise of disbursing federal funds. The court holds that Congress has power to enact criminal penalties under the Clause. It then holds that the bribery legislation is rationally related to achieving the efficacious expenditure of federal funds and is, therefore, a law necessary and proper to the execution of the spending power.
Congress has determined that the most effective way to protect the integrity of federal funds is to police the integrity of the agencies administering those funds. The maladministration of funds in one part of an agency can affect the allocation of federal funds throughout an agency. The statute addresses this problem by policing the integrity of the entire organization receiving federal benefits. If the statute was unconstitutional, the protection of federal funds would be left to the whim of state and local officials, perhaps the very same officials who have accepted a bribe.
Judge Bye dissented. Relying on federalism concepts in the Supreme Court decisions on sovereign immunity and the Tenth Amendment, he draws a distinction between necessary laws and proper ones, and finds the bribery statute not proper. He asserts a law is proper if it respects both the Constitution s limits on federal power and its grants of power to the states and the people. The statute intrudes upon state and local concerns by federalizing anti-corruption law, which is traditionally the domain of state and local legislation. The lack of any connection between the bribe and federal funds makes all too real the risk that federal anti-corruption efforts will replace state and local efforts to combat bribery. He compares the majority view to the unbounded extent of federal power under the Commerce Clause prior to Lopez and Morrison.