'Federalism' Justifies Vacating Consent Decree

The Seventh Circuit, citing “considerations of public interest and federalism,” has all but ordered a district court to vacate a consent decree entered into in 1983 that prohibits the City of Chicago from considering political affiliation in hiring.

The decision in Shakman v. City of Chicago, No. 04-2105, ---F.3d---, 2005 WL 2713775 (7th Cir. Oct. 24, 2005) casts further doubt on the need for the pending Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, which would seriously cripple the effectiveness of consent decrees. The legislation is sponsored by Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander and grows out of Tennessee’s attempts to get out of several Medicaid consent decrees. But like the City of Chicago, Tennessee has been able to get all the relief it needs in the appellate courts.

This decision is the second appeal this year in the Shakman case; in January, the Seventh Circuit held that the City had to comply with the decree unless it was modified, but sent strong hints that it should be. Following that invitation, the City contended that the consent decree should be vacated because a 1987 Seventh Circuit decision – from an appeal by county officials who did not settle – held that the original voter plaintiffs did not have standing. The district court found that the City’s motion 15 years after that decision was untimely, and that the City’s agreement to the consent decree prevented it from attacking the judgment.

The Seventh Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion on both rulings by failing to take into account the “flexibility” that the Supreme Court has required when revisiting consent decrees in institutional reform litigation and litigation that involves “considerations of public interest and federalism.” The court observed: “A very important fact in this case is that the 1983 Consent Decree provides for the ongoing involvement of a federal district court in the hiring decisions of the City of Chicago.” Although the Seventh Circuit technically remanded the matter for the district court to reconsider, it made clear that “we do not believe that the district court’s denial of the City’s Rule 60(b) motion can be reconciled with this court’s decision in O’Sullivan or the decisions of the Supreme Court in Rufo and Frew.”

The decision was written by Judge Coffey and joined by Judges Ripple and Kanne, all three Reagan appointees.