Alaska Supreme Court Upholds 1983 Rights
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The Supreme Court of Alaska ruled that several Alaskan Native Villages could bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Acting Director of the Division of Family and Youth Services for alleged systematic violations of the Adoption Assistance Act and the Indian Child Welfare Act. State of Alaska, Dept. of Health & Social Services v. Native Village of Curyung, 2006 WL 3691727 (Ala. Dec. 15, 2006).
The court first addressed whether the Villages are “Persons” capable of pursuing claims under § 1983. The court carefully analyzed Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701, 712 (2003), a case involving a search warrant for employment records as part of an investigation of Native American tribe members for alleged welfare fraud. The US Supreme Court ruled that “the Tribe may not sue under § 1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims.” The Alaska Supreme Court interpreted that case to “leave open the possibility that villages might under the proper circumstances be able to bring suit under § 1983.” The Alaska court noted that lower courts “are divided over whether sovereigns may bring non-parens patriae claims in their own right under § 1983, [but] where sovereigns have pressed § 1983 claims using the doctrine of parens patriae, several courts have allowed those claims to go forward.” The court held that the villages could bring suit as parens patriae to prevent future violations of the Adoption Act and the Indian Child Welfare Act but that the villages could not bring suit on their own behalf.
The Villages sued the State directly. The superior court allowed the Villages to sue the State, reasoning that Alaska had waived its sovereign immunity by entering into a contract pursuant to the Adoption Act that third-party beneficiaries could enforce. The Alaska Supreme Court held that whether or not Alaska waived its sovereign immunity was irrelevant, since there was no cause of action to sue the state under § 1983. Nevertheless, the Villages also sued the Acting Director of the Division of Family and Youth Services. The court held that under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), “a state officer who violates federal law or the federal constitution is presumed to be acting without the authority of the state, [and therefore suits against the officer] are simply deemed not to be suits against the state, so they do not implicate a state’s sovereign immunity.” Since the Villages sought only injunctive and declaratory relief, their claims against the Acting Director in his official capacity were proper under § 1983 and not prohibited by sovereign immunity.
The court then turned to the question of whether the statutes at issue in the case conferred enforceable rights. The state argued that the applicable provisions of the Adoption Assistance Act did not create enforceable rights under the test set forth in Gonzaga University v. Roe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). The Adoption Act requires the state to have a plan to develop individual case plans and to provide a case review system. The Alaska Supreme Court held that these requirements passed the Gonzaga test. The court held that the requirements are expressly directed toward individual child in foster care. The court held that “the right to a state plan is not vague or amorphous. A state either has a plan or it does not.” The court found the language of the statute to be mandatory and enforceable.
However, the court emphasized the limited nature of the enforceable right. The court stated that it does “not read these provisions as guaranteeing that an individual case plan meeting all requisite elements will actually be provided in any particular case. As we read these provisions, the enforceable right they create is systematic: it ensures that the state will develop, adopt, and enforce a statewide system designed to provide each family and child with a class plan that meets the statute’s specifications; but it does not give all parents and children a case-by-case guarantee of a satisfactory plan.” Thus, the court held that only systemic violations of the Adoption Act were actionable, not merely an allegation of a violation in an individual case.
The state did not contest the Villages’ claim that the Indian Child Welfare Act created enforceable rights; instead, the state contended that the Indian Child Welfare Act provides a remedy that displaces any remedies under § 1983. The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the factors for determining whether Congress intended to foreclose remedies under § 1983, as set forth in City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005). The court noted that there are three applicable factors: (1) whether the statutory remedy would normally be available under § 1983 or whether the remedy expands upon those available under § 1983; (2) whether the statutory remedy creates procedural limitations that are more stringent than those provided in § 1983; (3) whether allowing a party to proceed under § 1983 would be inconsistent with the compromises reached in the statute.
The court held that in passing the Indian Child Welfare Act, Congress intended to preserve the remedies available under § 1983. First, the court found that the statute adds remedies to those available under § 1983, which weighs in favor of a conclusion that Congress intended the Act to supplement and not displace § 1983. Second, the court found that the lack of any statute of limitation could not “reasonably be construed as an attempt to displace the broader range of relief offered under § 1983.” Third, the court found that § 1983 would not undermine the Indian Child Welfare Act, because while § 1983 addressed systemic violations, the Indian Child Welfare Act was directed toward individual challenges of individual placements. The court found that “regardless of whether the villages are allowed to proceed [under § 1983], individual parents, children, guardians, and tribes will still be able to invalidate improper placements and improper terminations of parental rights.”
The Alaska Supreme Court remanded the case for a decision on the merits.