No Private Enforcement of ADA Regulations
Keywords
The district court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that ADA regulations regarding designation of “key stations” for access to disabled riders were not privately enforceable, either through an implied private right of action or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court held that the relevant Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RHA) statutory provisions did confer a private right of action, but not the applicable regulations, which were at the heart of the plaintiff’s case. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the Transit Authority. Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Auth., 2006 WL 3392733 (ED. Pa. Nov. 17, 2006). The judge, Gene Pratter, is a Bush II appointee.
Disabled in Action (DIA) is a non-profit corporation which acts as an advocate for the civil rights of persons with disabilities. DIA sought declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) to make two subway stations accessible to individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.
DIA argued that the two subway stations at issue were subject to “key station” requirements of the ADA. These two stations had not been designated as key stations by SEPTA. SEPTA moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no private right of action to compel it to designate these two stations as key stations.
The court held that there is an implied private right of action to enforce section 504 of the RHA, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and section 12132 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, both of which prohibit the exclusion of qualified individuals with disabilities from government services and programs. The court relied heavily on Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent, citing Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185-86 (2002), Three Rivers Ctr. for Independent Living Inc. v. Housing Auth. of the City of Pittsburgh, 382 F.3d 412, 416 (3d Cir. 2004); and Bowers v. NCAA, 346 F.3d 402, 433 (3d Cir. 2003).
The next issue was whether section 12147 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12147(b), was privately enforceable. This provision requires that it shall be considered discrimination for a public entity that provides public transportation to fail to make key stations in rail systems readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs. The court stated that the Third Circuit had not decided whether there was an implied private right of action to enforce this provision. The court cited heavily from Sabree ex rel Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004), which in turn analyzed Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) and Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). The district court held that this provision of the ADA met all applicable requirements for a private right of action. The court noted that DIA represented individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, and therefore DIA is among the intended beneficiaries of the act. The court found that the right DIA seeks to enforce, i.e. the right to compel SEPTA to make key stations accessible, is specific and enumerated. The court ruled that the obligations on the public entity were unambiguous and binding. The court determined that the statute contained “rights-creating” language that was “individually focused.” The court concluded that the structure of the ADA clearly supports the existence of a private right.
However, the court found that in order to prevail DIA would have to challenge SEPTA’s failure to designate the two stations as “key stations.” To do so, DIA had to enforce the regulations which provide that each “public entity shall determine which stations on its system are key stations.” The regulation also sets forth the criteria for determining key stations and requires consultation with individuals with disabilities in the planning and public participation process. 49 C.F.R. § 37.47(b). The court stated that under Third Circuit precedent from the Three Rivers Center case, regulations would only be privately enforceable if they do no more than construe personal rights that the statute creates. The court held that the 37.47(b) does not construe personal rights that the ADA creates. The court held that §37.47(b) is directed at the public entity and does not focus on the individual beneficiary. The court stated that even though the public entity is required to include individuals with disabilities in the process of determining key stations, the regulation had a clear focus on the public entity, and not on personal rights.
The issue was further complication by an additional regulation, 49 C.F.R. § 37.53, which created an exception for Philadelphia and provided that the identification of key stations under a June 1989 court settlement (unrelated to the case at bar) was deemed to be in compliance with the regulatory requirements. The court read this regulation to merely impose the requirement that SEPTA make the key stations identified in the settlement agreement accessible, and the two stations over which DIA filed suit were not identified as key stations in the settlement agreement.
Thus, the court concluded that DIA did not have either an implied private right of action or a private right of action under section 1983. The court stated: “Because the rights that the DOT regulations at issue here articulate are not personal rights, DIA cannot enforce those rights under Section 1983.”