Ohio District Court Dismisses Rehab Act Complaint
In a case concerning payment of college tuition as part of vocational rehabilitation services for people with disabilities, an Ohio federal district court dismissed without prejudice a complaint seeking to enforce Title I of the Rehabilitation Act.In a case concerning payment of college tuition as part of vocational rehabilitation services for people with disabilities, an Ohio federal district court dismissed without prejudice a complaint seeking to enforce Title I of the Rehabilitation Act. The court held that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Jackie S. v. Connelly, 2006 WL 2033700 (S.D. Ohio 2006).
The Ohio Rehabilitation Services Commission promulgated an administrative rule limiting the amount of financial assistance the state would provide to disabled individuals seeking a post-secondary education. In a class action suit, eligible students alleged that the administrative rule is contrary to Title I of the Rehabilitation Act and its regulations.
The district court held that the state did not have sovereign immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and that Ex parte Young is applicable to enforcement of the Rehabilitation Act. The court also ruled that there was no need for all of the named plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies, because such exhaustion would be futile.
However, the court held that there is neither an express nor an implied private right of action in either the Rehabilitation Act or the implementing regulations for plaintiffs seeking relief for systemic violations of the Act. The court stated that “no court has ever read Title I of the Rehabilitation Act to create an express cause of action.” The court noted that in 1998, Congress provided a right to a private civil action after a final hearing decision. 29 U.S.C. § 722 (c)(5)(J).
Finding that the Rehabilitation Act did not confer a right of action, the court then looked to see whether Section 1983 would provide a basis for suit. Plaintiffs alleged a violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (The heading of the court’s discussion of 1983 states that plaintiffs alleged federal law violations enforceable through 1983, but the body of the discussion on 1983 does not address federal law violations.) The court noted that while the due process claim had been clarified in the briefing on the motion to dismiss, the complaint “makes a bare assertion that the college training rule is ‘arbitrary.’” The court held that the complaint’s allegation that the state’s action was “arbitrary” was insufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court dismissed this claim without prejudice and gave the plaintiffs 20 days to amend their complaint to correct this deficiency.
Plaintiffs further alleged that state law conflicted with federal law and was therefore preempted pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. The court held that the complaint’s mere assertion that the state rule is preempted was too vague to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court gave the plaintiffs twenty days to amend this claim as well.