Hawaii District Court 1983 Decision

The district court of Hawaii held that Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), overruled Ninth Circuit precedent, so that § 1983 is no longer available to enforce the Admission Act, the federal statute whereby Hawaii became a state in the United States.

The district court of Hawaii, Judge Mollway (a Clinton appointee), held that Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), overruled Ninth Circuit precedent, so that § 1983 is no longer available to enforce the Admission Act, the federal statute whereby Hawaii became a state in the United States. Day v. Apoliona, 2006 WL 2338212 (D. Haw. Aug. 10, 2006). The Admission Act established a public trust to be used for the betterment of native Hawaiians. The plaintiffs challenged the use of public trust funds by the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, alleging funds for native Hawaiians were disbursed “without regard to blood quantum.”

The district court focused on the following statement in Gonzaga: “A court’s role in discerning whether personal rights exist in the § 1983 context should therefore not differ from its role in discerning whether personal rights exist in the implied right of action context.” 536 U.S. at 285. The district court interpreted Gonzaga as holding that there can be no enforceable rights under 1983 if there is no implied private right of action.

In Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Assn. v. Hawaiian Homes Commission, 588 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1978) (Keaukaha I), the Ninth Circuit had held that there was no private right of action under the Admission Act. Nevertheless, subsequent decisions held that there was a statutory right enforceable under § 1983. Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Assn. v. Hawaiian Homes Commission, 739 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1984)(Keaukaha II); Price v. Akaka, 3 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1993). Indeed in Keaukaha II, the Ninth Circuit explicitly held that the absence of a private right of action did not preclude the finding of a right to enforce pursuant to § 1983.

However, in Day, the district court stated that Gongaza forced a change:

The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Keaukaha I, 588 F.2d at 1223-35, that neither the text nor the legislative history of the Admission Act indicates any congressional intent to create a private right of action requires the conclusion here that the Admission Act confers no individual rights enforceable under § 1983.

The district court acknowledged that it was disregarding prior Ninth Circuit caselaw, but claimed that this was mandated by the US Supreme Court, a higher authority, in Gonzaga. The district court held that the Admission Act failed the first prong of Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff), based on the lack of a private right of action.