Skip to content.
 
Skip to navigation

NSCLC Website

A   A   A  
Sections
Document Actions
  • Send this page to somebody
  • Print this page
  • Bookmark and Share

Good 6th Cir. Title IX Case

The Sixth Circuit held that Title IX does not preclude relief for constitutional claims under § 1983.

The Sixth Circuit held that Title IX does not preclude relief for constitutional claims under § 1983. Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, 2006 WL 2355596 (6th Cir. Aug. 16, 2006). The case was brought by parents and high school athletes contending that the Michigan High School Athletic Association’s scheduling of sports seasons discriminated against female athletes on the basis of gender.

The case previously had been appealed all the way to the US Supreme Court, which vacated the earlier decision for reconsideration in light of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005). The Rancho suit sought damages under § 1983 for violations of the Telecommunications Act, and the Supreme Court held that relief under § 1983 was precluded, based on the remedies provided in the Telecommunications Act.

On remand in Communities for Equity, Sixth Circuit judges Cole and Gilman, both of whom are Clinton appointees, ruled that the Rancho case did not warrant any change in the earlier decision permitting constitutional claims to proceed under § 1983. Judge Kennedy, who is a Carter appointee, dissented, and stated that Title IX supplants gender-based equal protection claims under § 1983.

The majority decision in Communities for Equity relies heavily on an earlier Sixth Circuit decision, Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Ed., 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996). Lillard held that Title IX contains no comprehensive enforcement scheme and the remedies afforded in Title IX are insufficient to preclude the pursuit of a remedy under § 1983 for constitutional violations. In Communities for Equity, the Sixth Circuit interpreted the Rancho case as being limited to plaintiffs who attempted to recover only for violations of federal statutory law (as opposed to constitutional law) through the enforcement mechanism of § 1983, when the statute provided a comprehensive enforcement scheme. The Sixth Circuit held that Rancho did not in any way overrule or invalidate Lillard, and therefore, the court continued to abide by its earlier decision in Lillard. The court of appeals stated that “Congress did not intend for the termination of federal funds – the only remedy explicitly authorized by Title IX – to serve as a comprehensive or exclusive remedy.”

The Sixth Circuit notes there is a split among courts of appeals on this issue. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits, now joined by the Sixth, have held that Title IX is not comprehensive enough to be exclusive of relief under § 1983. Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir. 1997); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996). However, the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits have reached the opposite conclusion, holding that Title IX precludes access to § 1983 for constitutional claims. Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1998); Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1996); Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990).

On the merits, the Sixth Circuit held that the Athletic Association had violated the girls’ rights under the equal protection clause, Title IX, and Michigan’s civil rights statute.