Ninth Circuit Case on Fourteenth Amendment

The Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the application of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) to the denial of a land use permit.

A non-profit Sikh organization was denied a building permit for a temple after a hearing in which neighbors complained about effects upon the agricultural uses of surrounding land, traffic, and property values. The district court had held that the denial of the permit inhibited Guru Nanak’s religious exercise, as protected by RLUIPA. The court of appeals affirmed and held that the federal law was a valid exercise of Congress’ powers under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2006).

The case is significant not only because it is a positive decision upholding congressional legislative power but also because of the history of the interplay between Congress and the Supreme Court in this area.

In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (“Smith”), 494 U.S. 872 (1990), state employees were fired and denied unemployment compensation for the “misconduct” of sacramental use of peyote in a ceremony of a Native American Church. The Supreme Court held in Smith that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment does not inhibit a state from enforcement of valid laws of general application that incidentally burden religious conduct. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion. Justice O’Connor concurred. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented.

In direct response to Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA), which prohibited governments from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden resulted from a rule of general applicability unless there was a compelling governmental interest and the government utilized the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. Yet, the Supreme Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997), the Supreme Court held that RFRA was an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment because of a lack of proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. Justices Stevens and Scalia concurred. Justice O’Connor, Breyer and Souter dissented.

Then in direct response to City of Boerne, Congress enacted RLUIPA, which narrowed the applicability of the law to regulations regarding land use and prison conditions. The Supreme Court unanimously held in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005), in a decision written by Justice Ginsberg, that RLUIPA’s applicability to prison conditions was within the proper bounds of congressional power. The Supreme Court held that RLUIPA did not exceed the limits of permissible government accommodation of religious practices. The Court gave great weight to congressional hearings regarding barriers to inmates practicing their religion.

The Ninth Circuit similarly held in Guru Nanak that the provisions of RLUIPA regarding land use were validly enacted pursuant to Congress’ enforcement power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that in nine hearings, Congress “compiled a substantial amount of statistical and anecdotal data demonstrating that governmental entities nationwide purposefully exclude unwanted religious groups by denying them use permits through discretionary and subjective standards and processes.” The court held that RLUIPA was a “congruent and proportional response to free exercise violations because it targets only regulations that … violate individual’s religious exercise.” The judges on the Ninth Circuit panel were D.W. Nelson (Carter), Rawlinson (Clinton), and Bea (Reagan).