5th Cir.: No enforceable rights in Uniform Relocation Act provisions

The Fifth Circuit held that a provision of the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act (URA), guaranteeing advisory services to displaced individuals, does not create a private right of action.

In a brief opinion, the court reasoned that the provision –which states that a “displacing agency shall ensure that the [services described in this section] are made available to all persons displaced by such agency” – is focused on regulating the agency and lacks rights-creating language. Delancey v. City of Austin, --- F.3d ----, 2009 WL 1532967 (5th Cir. June 3, 2009) (No. 08-50934).

 

          The plaintiffs sold land to the city in exchange for both monetary compensation and “relocation benefits.” The land was used by the city for an airport expansion.  When plaintiffs failed to find a suitable new property from which to operate their business, they sued, claiming the city had violated their rights under the URA, and seeking damages under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an implied right of action in the URA.  The panel affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 claim on the ground that plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that the city’s alleged actions reflected official policy, as is required for municipal liability under § 1983. The panel focused its attention on the implied-right-of-action claim, which it analyzed under Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).

 

          This is the first post-Gonzaga circuit decision to consider the existence of a private right of action under this statute. The operative provision in this case is 42 U.S.C. § 4625(b), quoted above. Subsection (c) defines the mandated services, which “shall include such measures…as may be necessary or appropriate” to assist owners in obtaining and becoming established in a new property, including advising them on the availability and prices of suitable locations. The key language of subsection (b) –“shall ensure that the [services] are made available to all persons” – is similar to language in Medicaid and Housing Act provisions that have been held enforceable since Gonzaga. See, e.g., Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2006); Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.); Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Parish, 442 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2006); Price v. City of Stockton, 390 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2004).

 

Instead of citing cases like these, the panel relied only on Gonzaga and Equal Access for El Paso v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding unenforceable a very different Medicaid provision with no reference to individual persons). Comparing the URA provisions to the educational privacy statute in Gonzaga, the panel declared that they “are directed at the ‘head of any displacing agency’ rather than at the individuals benefitted.” Moreover, the court said “the URA does not contain rights-creating language like that in” Title VI of the Civil Rights Act or Title IX of the Education Amendments (“No person …shall…be subjected to discrimination”). “Instead,” the court wrote, the URA merely “prescribes a policy and practice for administering relocation assistance.”

 

In a footnote, the court dismissed pre-Gonzaga URA precedents from the First and Third Circuits, saying they “conflict with Gonzaga.” The court also said these cases were distinguishable because the instant case contained claims for money damages.