3d Cir. defines receipt of federal funding under Rehab Act

The Third Circuit held that receipt of federal funds by a county court's domestic relations unit constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity under the Rehabilitation Act for all activities of the judicial district.

 The court based its holding on an examination of state law and official documents. It noted, however, that the result would be different if the federally-funded office were “separate[d]...into [an] autonomous department.” Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Probation & Parole, --- F.3d ----, 2008 WL 5412473 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 2008) (Nos. 07-3720/07-3733).

 

          The Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability discrimination by “any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Coverage extends to “all of the operations” of a funded entity, § 794(b). Covered agencies waive their immunity under the act by accepting federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7.  Coverage tends to be construed broadly, though appellate decisions on the issue are sparse. See generally Bobroff & Tobin, Strings Attached, 42 Clearinghouse Rev. 16 (2008).

 

          Here, plaintiff alleges employment discrimination by the county's probation and parole office, a subdivision of Pennsylvania's 53rd Judicial District. That office does not receive federal funds, but the District's Domestic Relations Section (DRS) receives federal funds for child support enforcement. The court therefore framed the issue as whether the DRS was a subunit of the District or an independent “program or activity.”

 

          The court first looked to state law, observing that state law provides for each District's common pleas court to have a DRS comprised of “staff of the court.” Secondarily the court pointed to prior dicta treating a Pennsylvania DRS as part of the common pleas court. Rogers v. Bucks County DRS, 959 F.2d 1268, 1271 n. 4 (3d Cir.1992). Additionally, the court pointed to official documents, including the DRS contract for federal funds and its child support handbook, which described it as part of the District. Accordingly, the court held that the DRS is part of the District, and the District, including the parole division, is subject to suit under the RA.

 

          The court compared this case to Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2002), which permitted a state prison employee's RA claim based solely on the prison's receipt of federal funds for housing illegal aliens. It also pointed to Thomlison v. City of Omaha, 63 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 1995), which applied the RA to a city's fire division based on federal funding to its police division, because both were units of the city's public safety department.

 

          The court noted that “Pennsylvania remains free to separate its domestic relations sections and like entities into autonomous departments or agencies” and thereby avoid extension of the RA to entire judicial districts. The court did not define what makes an entity “autonomous,” rather than a mere subunit of another entity. While courts generally look to formal divisions of government structure and administrative authority, at least one decision has treated a subordinate state agency as independent for purposes of the RA where it had separate funding and independent control of its staff. Brewer v. Wisc. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 2006 WL 752922 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd, 270 Fed.Appx. 418 (7th Cir. 2008).